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Abstract—At present, electricity markets largely ignore the fact
that renewable power producers impose significant externalities
on non-renewable energy producers. This is because consumers
are generally guaranteed electricity within certain load parame-
ters. The intermittent nature of production by renewable energy
producers implies that they rely on non-renewable producers so
that the aggregate power delivered meets the promised quality of
service. This implicit insurance provided by the non-renewable
power sector to consumers is not currently priced and leads to
an often ignored, hidden monetary transfer from non-renewable
producers to renewable producers. As the fraction of energy
supplied by renewable resources increases, these externalities
also increase. In this paper, we quantify these externalities by
developing the market clearing price of energy in the presence
of renewable energy. We consider a day-ahead electricity market
where renewable and non-renewable generators bid by proposing
their asking price per unit of energy to an independent system
operator (ISO). The ISO’s problem is a multi-stage stochastic
optimization problem to dispatch energy from each generator
to minimize the cost of purchased energy on behalf of the
consumers. We incorporate the notion of load variance using
the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVAR) measure in the day-ahead
electricity market to ensure that the generators are able to meet
the load within a desired confidence level. We analytically derive
the market clearing price of energy as a function of CVAR. It is
shown that a higher penetration level of the renewable energies
may increase the market clearing price of energy.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider an electric grid that delivers demanded elec-
tricity to consumers. The grid consists of a non-renewable
generator unit, a renewable generator unit, a transmission
line, and a consumer. The non-renewable generator unit is
composed of N generators with different output power limits,
start-up costs, no-load costs, fuel costs per unit of generated
energy, and minimum up and down times. The non-renewable
and renewable generators are operated by different agents. For
simplicity, we assume that there is only one transmission line
and that the consumers are not able to distinguish between
renewable energy (RE) and non-renewable energy (NRE).
The renewable energy production is described by a stochastic
process that may implicitly include curtailment. We assume
that the grid takes all resultant renewable energy. Thus the
non-renewable generator is dispatched to meet the net-load,
which is the consumer load minus the renewable generator
output (Figure 1).
The day-ahead energy market is designed to commit the
non-renewable generators 24-hours in advance and to set
Fig. 1. Electric grid model; r1 is the resistance from bus 1 to the bus 3; r2
is the resistance from bus 2 to the bus 3; pnr is the non-renewable power; pr
is the renewable power; pd is the load power.
prices for each hour. The load must be met within a confidence
level. The day-ahead market is cleared so as to minimize the
total cost of energy. In the day-ahead bid, the non-renewable
generators provide information about the asking price per unit
of energy for each generator and their output limits to an
independent system operator (ISO). The renewable generator
only provides its demanded price for each unit of energy to
the ISO. The ISO after receiving the price of non-renewable
and renewable energies, determines the output power for each
non-renewable generator that will ensure a given level of relia-
bility to meet the load, and the corresponding market-clearing
prices through the next 24 hours. The main result is that the
market clearing price of energy may increase with greater
penetration of renewable energy into the grid. Consequently,
if the consumers impose the constraint of a maximum price
for energy that they are willing to pay, a monetary transfer
from the renewable producer to the non-renewable producer
may be required to make the non-renewable producer whole.
This transfer characterises the externality that the renewable
producer imposes on the grid and is currently absorbed by
the non-renewable producer. Further, if the price paid by the
consumer is especially low, this may be a natural cap on the
level of renewable penetration. The market clearing price is
shown to be a non-decreasing function of uncertainty of the
net load, the reliability demanded by the consumer, and the
loss in the grid. Although the model we consider is stylized,
the conclusions are striking and may point to a fundamental
rethinking of the way renewable portfolio standards are cur-
rently planned.
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Several works that are representative of the direction of this
study include [1]- [8], which study the problem under different
market settings. The studies most related to our work are [1]
and [2]. They develop optimal strategies to inject wind energy
into the grid under a fixed market price of energy. Unlike
these works, we develop the market clearing price of energy
to quantify the effect of uncertainty of the load and renewable
energies on the market clearing price of energy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we formulate and solve the optimization problem of the ISO
with the goal of minimizing the cost of energy while ensuring
the planned generators in the day-ahead market are able to
meet the load within a desired confidence level. In Section III
we show the numerical results obtained through simulations.
Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section IV.
II. ISO PROBLEM
A. Notation
The following notations are used in this work.
• pt` : Total active power loss at time t
• ptd : Active power requested by consumer
• pti : Output power of the ith non-renewable generator at
time t
• ptnr : Total active power generated by non-renewable
generator unit
• ptr : Active power generated by renewable source
• ri : Transmission line resistance
• (.)+ = max(., 0)
• st := ptd + r2(p
t
r)
2 − ptr
• pii : Asking price per unit of energy of the ith generating
unit
• pir : Asking price per unit of renewable energy.
B. Load and Renewable Energy
It is assumed that the load and renewable resource output
are dependent, random variables with known distributions.
Let T = {1, 2, ..., T} be the index set. Define (PD, Pr)
as the random processes on the probability space (Ω,F,P).
PD = {P tD, t ∈ T} and Pr = {P tr , t ∈ T} represent the
load and renewable resource power respectively. For a fixed t,
and for all ω ∈ Ω, P tD(ω) and P tr (ω) are non-negative random
variables with known continuous probability density functions.
For the given ω ∈ Ω, P tD and P tr are deterministic functions
of t that denote the load realization and renewable resource
power realization respectively, at time t, donated by ptd, and
ptr.
C. Power Flow Constraints
We assume the non-renewable generator unit is composed
of N generators. Let pti be the output power of the ith
generating unit at time t. Rapid changes in output power,
which cause rapid changes in the generator temperature or
physical design, may increase maintenance costs. The output
of non-renewable generators can be limited by the generator
capacity, or constraints on the quantity of fuel and CO2
emissions. Each unit must obey an output limit such that for
all i = 1, ..., N
pmini ≤ pti ≤ pmaxi . (1)
The total output of non-renewable generator units is given as
ptnr =
N∑
i=1
pti. (2)
We assume that the voltage at each bus is equal to one. The
total active power loss (pt`) is approximated as
pt` ≈ r1(ptnr)2 + r2(ptr)2. (3)
The power balance equation is given as
ptnr + p
t
r − pt` = ptd, (4)
with a desired level of reliability ω ∈ Ω.
D. Day-Ahead Market
Let pir be the asking price per unit of energy of the renew-
able generator unit. The price of output energy of renewable
generators is defined based on the levelized cost of electricity
(LCOE), [9]. LCOE is the cost of one unit of energy over
the lifetime of the generator and its associated parts. Let
pii be the asking price per unit of energy of the ith non-
renewable generator. Without loss of generality, we assume
that 0 < pir < pi1 < ... < piN .
Let pnr := {(pt1, ..., ptN )}24t=1 and pr := {ptr}24t=1. The ISO
decides on a pnr that minimizes the total cost of energy
through the next 24 hours as follows
min
pnr
24∑
t=1
EPD,Pr
[ N∑
i=1
piip
t
i + pirp
t
r
]
, (5)
with respect to (1)-(4). We assume that the ISO is not aware
of the start up cost, no-load cost and minimum up and
down time of the generators. ISO only receives the bidding
price and power from non-renewable generators. Therefore,
the multi-stage optimization problem (5) is disjointed through
stages (time). Let nt = (pt` + p
t
d − ptnr − ptr)+ and Fnt be
the cumulative distribution function of the nt, we use the
concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk
(CVaR), [10]. V aRα(nt) determines the worst possible nt that
may occur within a given confidence level α. For a given
0 < α < 1, the amount of nt will not exceed V aRα(nt) with
probability α,
V aRα(n
t) = min{z|Fnt(z) ≥ α}. (6)
CVaR is defined as the conditional expectation of nt above
the amount VaRα. Let E denote the expectation over nt.
CV aRα(n
t) = E[nt|nt > V aRα(nt)], (7)
CV aRα(n
t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
zdFαnt(z), (8)
where
Fαnt(z) =
{
0, if z < V aRα(nt)
Fnt (z)−α
1−α , otherwise
.
In the day-ahead market the objective is to plan for the
generators such that they are capable of meeting the load
within the confidence level. We write the condition (4) as
CV aRα(n
t) = 0. (9)
Let ptnr = (p
t
1, ..., p
t
N ). We define (µ˜i, µi) and λ
t as the
lagrange multipliers corresponding to (1) and (9). The lagrange
function for the ISO problem is given as
Lt(pnr) =EPD,Pr
[ N∑
i=1
piip
t
i + pirp
t
r
]
+ λt
[
CV aRα(n
t)
]
(10)
+
N∑
i=1
µi
[
pti − pmaxi
]
+
N∑
i=1
µ˜i
[
pmini − pti
]
.
Theorem 1: Let st := ptd + r2(ptr)2 − ptr, it is claimed that
CV aRα(n
t) = r1(
N∑
i=1
pti)
2 −
N∑
i=1
pti + CV aRα(s
t). (11)
Proof. The proof is omitted and will be provided in the
journal version due to space constraints.
It is evident from (11) that CV aRα(nt) is convex in ptnr,
therefore the lagrange function (10) is convex in ptnr. By
substituting (11) in (10)
Lt(ptnr) =EPD,Pr
[ N∑
i=1
piip
t
i + pirp
t
r
]
(12)
+ λt
[
r1(
N∑
i=1
pti)
2 −
N∑
i=1
pti + CV aRα(s
t)
]
+
N∑
i=1
µi
[
pti − pmaxi
]
+
N∑
i=1
µ˜i
[
pmini − pti
]
.
The necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the
ISO’s problem are
pii + 2λ
tr1
N∑
i=1
pti − λt + µi − µ˜i = 0, (13)
r1(
N∑
i=1
pti)
2 + CV aRα(s
t) =
N∑
i=1
pti, (14)
pmini ≤ pti ≤ pmaxi , (15)
µi(p
t
i − pmaxi ) = 0, (16)
µ˜i(p
min
i − pti) = 0, (17)
µi ≥ 0, µ˜i ≥ 0. (18)
In order to have a feasible solution for the ISO’s problem
((13)-(18)), Assumption 1 is considered.
Assumption 1: Let pmin = min
1≤k≤N
pmink . It is assumed
that
a) 1− 4r1CV aRα(st) ≥ 0.
b) For all t = 1, ..., T{
pmin ≤ CV aRα(st) ≤
∑N
i=1 p
max
i , if r1 = 0
pmin ≤ 1±
√
1−4r1CV aRα(st)
2r1
≤∑Ni=1 pmaxi , if r1 > 0 .
(19)
Let pt be the solution of r1(pt)2 − pt + CV aRα(st) = 0.
Because of part a) of Assumption 1 the value of pt is real
and because of part b) of Assumption 1, there exists an unique
1 ≤ k ≤ N such that ∑k−1i=1 pmaxi < pt ≤ ∑ki=1 pmaxi . The
value of pt based on the value of r1 is given as follows.{
pt =
1±
√
1−4r1CV aRα(st)
2r1
, if r1 > 0
pt = CV aRα(s
t), if r1 = 0
(20)
By solving (13)-(18), the values of {µi}Ni=1, {µ˜i}Ni=1 and
λt are given below based on the value of pt −∑k−1i=1 pmaxi .
• pmink ≤ pt −
∑k−1
i=1 p
max
i ≤ pmaxk
µi > 0, µ˜i = 0, p
t
i = p
max
i for i = 1, ..., k − 1, (21)
µk = 0, µ˜k = 0, p
t
k = p
t −
k−1∑
i=1
pmaxi , (22)
µi = 0, µ˜i = 0, p
t
i = 0, for all i = k + 1, ..., N, (23)
λt =
pii + µi − µ˜i
1− 2r1pt (24)
=
pii + µi − µ˜i√
1− 4r1CV aRα(st)
, for all i = 1, ..., k
λt =
pik√
1− 4r1CV aRα(st)
. (25)
To develop the generators optimal output for the case that
0 < pt −∑k−1i=1 pmaxi < pmink , we consider Assumption 2.
Assumption 2: It is assumed that for all i = 1, ..., N
pmini < min
k
{pmaxk − pmink }. (26)
Assumption 2 ensures that if the first (k − 1)th generators
are operating at their maximum power and additional power
is needed to meet the day ahead load, when it is less than
pmink , then generator (k − 1)th can lower its output power
without violating its output power, such that the kth generator
operates at its minimum power (pmink ). This is proved in
Lemma 1, shown below, and is drawn from Assumption 1.
Lemma 1: If 0 < pt −∑k−1i=1 pmaxi < pmink then
pmink−1 < p
t −
k−2∑
i=1
pmaxi − pmink < pmaxk−1. (27)
Proof. The proof is omitted and will be provided in the
journal version due to space constraints.
• 0 < pt −∑k−1i=1 pmaxi < pmink
µi > 0, µ˜i = 0, p
t
i = p
max
i for all i = 1, ..., k − 2,
(28)
µk−1 = 0, µ˜k−1 = 0, ptk−1 = p
t −
k−2∑
i=1
pmaxi − pmink ,
(29)
µk = 0, µ˜k > 0, p
t
k = p
min
k , (30)
µi = 0, µ˜i = 0, p
t
i = 0, for all i = k + 1, ..., N, (31)
λt =
pii + µi − µ˜i
1− 2r1pt (32)
=
pii + µi − µ˜i√
1− 4r1CV aRα(st)
, for all i = 1, ..., k
λt =
pik−1√
1− 4r1CV aRα(st)
. (33)
It is evident from (25) and (33), that the market clearing
price of energy (λt) is higher at the times that st has a
heavier tail distribution. A heavier tail distribution leads to
a higher value of CV aRα(st) and larger index of k in (25)
and (33). Similarly, a higher level of reliability (larger α) leads
to a higher market clearing price of energy. The accuracy of
market clearing price (25) and (33) is heavily dependent on the
accuracy of the tail distribution of st. The tail distribution of
st depends on the load and renewable energy distributions and
model of loss function. In the next section, more descriptive
simulations are presented.
III. SIMULATIONS
Setup: We consider that the non-renewable generator is
composed of 6 units. The asking price per unit of energy and
the maximum output power for each unit is given in Table I.
It is assumed that pmini = 0 for all i = 1, ..., 6. The level of
reliability (α) demanded by consumer is fixed at 0.9.
TABLE I
MAXIMUM OUTPUT POWER (pmaxi ) AND ASKING PRICE (pii)
pmaxi 0.05 0.1 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.25
pii 20 30 40 50 60 70
We assume the load has a Gaussian distribution with
a mean of 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.1. We repeat
the simulation analysis for different scenarios of renewable
energy penetration. In all scenarios, the renewable energy has
a Gaussian distribution.
Case I: We assume the standard deviation of the renewable
energy is fixed at 0.1 and the mean of renewable energy
takes values {0, 0.15, 0.25, 0.3, 0.45, 0.5, 0.65, 0.75, 0.8, 0.9}.
This corresponds to the naive expectation that the renewable
energy penetration increases, while the uncertainty does not
increase. The market clearing price of energy is plotted in
Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Market clearing price versus the mean of renewable energy penetration.
It is observable from Figure 2 that the market clearing
price of energy is decreasing in renewable energy penetration,
if the standard deviation (i.e., the uncertainty) of renewable
energy is kept constant while increasing the penetration. In
reality of course, as more renewable energy is integrated the
uncertainty in the total renewable energy also increases. We
consider that scenario in Case III and IV below.
Case II: We assume that the mean of renewable energy is fixed
at 0.5 and the standard deviation of renewable energy takes
values {0.01, 0.04, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5}. The
market clearing price of energy is plotted in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Market clearing price versus the variance of renewable energy
penetration.
It can be seen from Fig. 3 that higher variability in
renewable energy production increases the uncertainty in the
net load. This increases the risk of unnecessary high capacity
planning for the non-renewable generators in the day-ahead
market, and leads to a higher market clearing price of energy.
Case III: Let the mean and standard deviation of renewable
energy correspond to values
{0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.3, 0.45, 0.5, 0.65, 0.75, 0.8, 0.9}
and {0.06, 0.1, 0.12, 0.15, 0.32, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5}
respectively. The market clearing price of energy is plotted in
figure 4.
Fig. 4. Market clearing price versus the mean/variance of renewable energy
penetration.
In Figure 4, the market clearing price of energy decreases
until a certain level of the penetration is reached, after which
the price increases. The price decreases in the beginning
because of the lower marginal cost of renewable energy.
However, after a certain level, the payment to the non-
renewable generator to maintain the reliability constraints
catches up and the market clearing price increases. The plot
shows that (i) if the consumer insists on the lowest possible
market clearing price, then the penetration level of renewable
energy is capped; and (ii) if the consumer insists on a
given price for the energy it may become important for the
renewable producer to pay the non-renewable to compensate
the latter.
Case IV: We assume the mean and standard
deviation of renewable energy is fixed at 0.5 and
0.1 respectively. The line resistance r1 takes values
{0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.1, 0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.2, 0.22}. The
market clearing price of energy is plotted in figure 5.
Fig. 5. Market clearing price versus the value of (r1).
It is observable from Figure 5 that the market price of
energy is increasing in the line resistance. A longer grid line
(higher resistance) increases the loss of energy and increases
the required capacity for non-renewable generators. Locating
the renewable generators closer to the load leads to a lower
market price of energy. This observation provides alternate
methods to increase the renewable penetration.
IV. CONCLUSION
We quantify the market clearing price of energy in a day-
ahead market as a function of the desired level of reliabil-
ity. The expectation that increasing the penetration of the
renewable energy reduces the market price of energy would
be untrue if the uncertainty in the the renewable energy
generation increases by the higher penetration level. If the
consumer insists on paying no more than a certain price
for energy, the renewable producer must transfer money to
the non-renewable producer to compensate the latter. This
transfer is currently ignored, which implies a hidden subsidy
from non-renewable to the renewable producer. Understanding
and resolving such frictions to fully consider the effects of
uncertainty and fluctuations of renewable energies are central
to fully realizing the benefits of renewable energy.
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